Limited Indian military deployment: the time is nigh
The suicide attack on Thursday was the second such attack on the Indian Embassy in the past fifteen months in Kabul. The attack claimed the lives of seventeen, including the two Afghan policemen who attempted to deter the bomb-laden vehicle from breaching the compound.
Similar to the last attack on the Indian Embassy that left 60 dead last year, the footprint the terror consortium of the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, Taliban and ISI is clear. Earlier this month, Gen Stanley McChrystal stated in a leaked assessment, that growing Indian involvement in Afghanistan would encourage Pakistani “countermeasures”. More recently, former CIA Islamabad station chief Bob Grenier stated at a US Senate Foreign Relations Committee deposition that the close relationship between New Delhi and Kabul “literally drives [Pakistan] crazy”.
This comes at a time of considerable disquiet in Pakistan. The Kerry-Lugar Bill has met with vociferous disapproval, initially from the media, and later from the Pakistani Corps Commanders’ Conference. The disapproval is based on the belief that some provisions — including India-specific terror clauses — impinge on Pakistan’s sovereignty. The Pakistani government (and military) must clarify how these clauses violate Pakistan’s sovereignty. Specifically, Pakistan must articulate whether it believes that allowing its soil to be used to plan, organize and execute acts of terror against India is an exercise of its soverign right.
So, was the attack on the Indian Embassy meant to demonstrate Pakistan’s open defiance of Kerry-Lugar? Maybe, maybe not. Either way, if enlightenment hasn’t dawned on the Indian government now, it never will. Pakistan will continue to use such “countermeasures” because it knows it can do so without eliciting a military response from India. And increasing Indian involvement in the development of Afghanistan only increases the number of potential targets for the terror consortium.
Today, India’s ambitions in Afghanistan are not commensurate with the level of protection it is willing to provide to protect its interests. “Soft power” is an important element of state diplomacy, but when not backed up by a credible intent to defend, paints a picture of a state that is benign, diffident, weak-willed and apprehensive.
India must stop outsourcing its intelligence and security needs in Afghanistan to other countries. It must do what it has to do to protect its interests, its citizens and its friends. Hitherto, India received inputs mostly from Afghan and other intelligence agencies. It is time for India to upgrade its intelligence capability in Afghanistan; additional emphasis must also be placed on better intelligence coordination between Afghan, Indian and other foreign intelligence agencies.
Serious thought must be given to an Indian military deployment in Afghanistan. However, for India to get bogged down fighting an insurgency would be counter-productive and would risk squandering the goodwill of the government and people of Afghanistan.
Therefore, India needs to think along the lines of a limited military deployment in Afghanistan and one with a mandate to protect its citizens and interests in that country. This is India’s own “countermeasure”. India has invested over a $1.2 billion in Afghanistan; Indians from all walks of life — doctors, engineers, teachers and security professionals — attempt to secure the future of Afghanistan and its people. However, the security provided to these very individuals is either nonexistent or found wanting.
A deployment with limited mandate presents undeniable risks. The possibility of the lines between India’s defensive deployment and the larger US/ISAF COIN operation being blurred, the risk of Indian troops becoming targets for the Taliban, Haqqani and ISI consortium and loss of goodwill in Kabul do exist.
However, the alternative to this arrangement is the status quo — India’s current posture. As things stand today, a Pakistani attack on Indian citizens, property and interests in Afghanistan goes unchallenged. Not much is ever done by way of a response, apart from registering the customary “our patience is not inexhaustible” complaint with the US and holding back on dialog with Pakistan.
The choices before India are stark: either it believes that Indian property, investment and lives are worth sacrificing for the greater goal of strategic partnership with Afghanistan, or it accepts that Indian security cover is essential to protect those who undertake the perilous, yet noble journey of rebuilding a war ravaged nation and spreading the goodwill of India and its people in that part of the world. Time is running out, and India must decide soon. What is it going to be, Mr. Prime Minister?
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Filed under: Af-Pak, Afghanistan, America, Foreign Policy, India, Indian Army, NWFP, Pakistan, Swat, Terrorism, World, Afghanistan, COIN, embassy, grenier, Haqqani network, India, indian embassy attack, intelligence, isaf, isi, Jalaluddin Haqqani, kabul, kerry-lugar bill, mcchrystal, new delhi, Pakistan, senate, US